The 'Willy-Nicky' Letters: Introduction, and Letters I-V (8 November 1894-10 July 1895)
Go to Letters VI - XX (26 November 1895-13 June 1901)
Go to Letters XXI - XXVIII (22 August 1901 - 30 October 1904)
Go to Letters XXXIX - XLVIII (17 November 1904 - 27 July 1905)Go to Letters XLIX - LXXV (22 August 1905 - 26 March 1914)
LETTERS FROM THE KAISER TO THE CZAR
COPIED FROM GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES IN PETROGRAD
UNPUBLISHED BEFORE 1920
PRIVATE LETTERS FROM THE KAISER TO THE CZAR FOUND IN A
CHEST AFTER THE CZAR'S EXECUTION AND NOW IN
POSSESSION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
COPIED AND BROUGHT FROM RUSSIA
BY
ISAAC DON LEVINE
NEW YORK
FREDERICK A. STOKES COMPANY
PUBLISHERS
Frontispiece: 'Kaiser and Czar aboard the "Hohenzollern"
Introduction
Upon the execution of Nicholas Romanoff, the former Czar of Russia, and his wife and children inEkaterinburg in July, I9I8, a case containing his private correspondence was found among his personal effects. Among its contents was a batch of seventy-three letters from Kaiser Wilhelm to the Czar and a much more voluminous batch of letters from the Czarina to the Czar. The letters were transmitted by the local Ekaterinburg authorities to the central government in Moscow, where they are kept in the state archives.
There have been so many absurd stories in circulation in Europe in connection with the Kaiser-Czarletters that the circ*mstances of their publication in Europe and America should be made clear here.In Great Britain Winston Churchill eulogized The Morning Post for obtaining the letters, although thatjournal had nothing to do with the bringing of the letters out of Russia. The London Naval andMilitary Record commented editorially on the same subject as follows: "It has been left to theenterprise of British journalism to publish the last and by far the most damaging exposure ofGermany's ex-Kaiser." In Paris a prominentnewspaper, describing how I obtained the letters, declared that I was enabled to do so through myinfluence with Lenin. In Amsterdam a newspaper printed a despatch from its Berlin correspondentannouncing that the letters had once been published in I9I7 in a Petrograd monthly periodical.Now the facts are quite different from the foregoing allegations, which circulated in the Europeanpress for weeks. It was not the enterprise of British but of American journalism which gave the worldthe Kaiser's and Czarina's letters to the Czar. In April, I9I9, the writer left the United States to go toSoviet Russia in the capacity of correspondent for The Chicago Daily News, and made two trips therefrom Scandinavia, one in May and the other in September, I9I9.
During my second visit to Soviet Russia I was enabled to gain access to the archives of thegovernment where I discovered, among other things, the Kaiser's letters to the Czar, and immediatelyrealized their enormous historical value. The original letters are of course the property of the Russianstate and there was no question of obtaining them. The task consisted of receiving the permission ofthe proper authorities to take copies of the letters. I did not need Lenin's influence for this. As a matterof fact, I never even met Lenin while in Soviet Russia.
I carried out with me only one copy from the original letters of the Kaiser to the Czar. Thiscopy is in my possession and is the one reproduced in this volume. The copies of the letters used byThe Morning Post in London, the Vossische Zeitung in Berlin, the Journal in Paris and the otherEuropean publishers were made from the copy in my possession. Being second and third copies, theywere not free from errors. The present edition is therefore the only absolutely authoritative one andmust be treated as the original edition by students of international affairs.
The letters from the Kaiser to the Czar were written in English, the language of the Russian andGerman courts, and were usually addressed to "Nicky" and signed "Willy." None of these letters,covering a period of twenty years, I894-I9I4, has ever been published before 1920. Thecorrespondence between the Kaiser and the Czar, which was published in a Russian periodical in I9I7 and reprinted in a New York newspaper several months later, consisted of a number of telegramsexchanged between Willy and Nicky in the years I904-I907. It appeared as "The Willy-NickyCorrespondence," and the Amsterdam newspaper previously referred to confused it with the lettershere presented.
Without questioning the genuineness of the Willy-Nicky telegrams, it should nevertheless beemphasized that it is scarcely possible that no errors should have been committed in the transmissionof a large number of telegrams. In the case of the letters contained in this volume we have really a setof irrefutable and unquestionable documents. The Kaiser himself confirmed their genuineness,although criticizing their publication. In a letter written in January, 1920, from Amerongen, Holland,to Prince Fürstenberg, and reprinted in The London Times, on January 28th, the Kaiser wroteregarding these letters:
"What do you think about the unlawful publication of the correspondence with Nicholas? Thesepeople have not the least sympathy in them, and I shall be glad if everything is published withoutalterations. I have given orders to Loewenfeldt to protest against the publication of these privateletters, but as this is being done in hostile countries he will have less success than in the case ofBismarck. After the treatment I have received and still receive from the German people I am notsurprised that the German newspapers participate in these dirty practices."The Kaiser's letters are of course published without alterations. There was never any intention to dootherwise. Not a word in them is omitted. Although the Kaiser's English is far from perfect, it is leftunchanged here. The only change made in this edition is the substitution of the word "and" for thecharacter "&" which abounds in the original letters.
The numerous errors in spelling are retained. The most confusing of these errors is "were" in placeof "where." Once the Kaiser has "keys" instead of "quays," and "boyes" for "buoys." The other mistakes are understandable. "Beeing" for"being," "wether" for "whether," "takle" for "tackle," are common misspellings. Even more commonare "already," "allways," "wellfare," "openess," "assisstance." The Kaiser writes "courtesey," "existent"and "thruthfulness." Instead of "Turkey" he writes "Turky," and instead of "Dardanelles" he spells"Dardanels." His letters are replete with faulty constructions and contain many misspellings in additionto those here mentioned.
In reply to the Kaiser's complaint about the publication of his private letters, Maximilian Harden, thenoted German publicist, wrote: "The ex-Kaiser stigmatizes as a 'dirty' violation of propriety thepublication of his letters to the Czar Nicholas and other monarchs, whereas he considered it to be hisright and his duty to purloin documents in Belgium, to falsify them, and to circulate them all over theglobe. This, however, is not surprising when the German people, who endured an adept intheatricalism for thirty years, are treated as if they were evilminded, undutiful children."
The comment on the letters all over the world has been as voluminous as it has been many-sided.However, three main viewpoints can be discerned in the very numerous reviews of the Kaiser'scorrespondence. First, the opinion of the Kaiser held by The Morning Post, Great Britain's leading Tory organ. Second, the comment of The Manchester Guardian, the great Liberal journal. Third, theaverage German view of Wilhelm as expressed by Professor Walter Goetz.
To The Morning Post the letters reveal the Kaiser as an arch-plotter. Its comment has been expressedin a series of comprehensive and virile editorials bearing such titles as "the arch-conspirator," the"honest Iago," and "Nemesis." Selections from some of the leading articles of The Morning Post * are given below:
* Note. Many of the notes following the letters in this volume have been culled from the columns of The London Morning Post.
The publication of the letters of the GERMAN EMPEROR to the EMPEROR of ALL the RUSSIAShas naturally awakened a profound interest both in this country and abroad, in fact throughout thecivilised world. Never before, perhaps, has there been made known in the lifetime of the author socomplete and so voluminous an exposition of the vast and unscrupulous intrigues and the grandioseambitions of the powerful and autocratic monarch of a great military nation. Thus the Imperial lettersmake an historical document of the highest value, providing the key to the complex and hiddenmachinery of European international policies during the ten years preceding the Great War, which wastheir inevitable and disastrous consummation. In as far as the GERMAN EMPEROR himself isconcerned, there is little scope for conjecture, inasmuch as he condemns himself with his own hand.History as a general rule is largely a matter of piecing together available evidence and filling in the gaps with ingenious and learned hypotheses. Thediscovery of new evidence not infrequently invalidates the historian's reconstruction, as in the notableinstance of the records of the French Revolution, lately so admirably rewritten by M. LENÔTRE. Butin the case of the letters of WILLIAM HOHENZOLLERN the documents are complete. The records of the conversation at one end of the telephone, as it were, are precise, and although the writtenevidence of the replies is not available their nature may be divined with a general accuracy by thestudent of the affairs of the time. Light is concentrated upon the central figure of the long dramawhich merged into tragedy at last, and in the shadow beyond may be discerned other Kings andEmperors, their Ministers and Chancelleries, and beyond these again swarming factories foundingcannon, and busy dockyards building ships of war, and the hosts of armed men. That single figure souncontrollably active in the lighted circle, swiftly writing, issuing commands with passionate gesture,continually agitates the dimmer groups beyond, and the tremor speeds across seas and continents untilPeking is perturbed, there is a stir in Tokyo, and even the massive tranquillity of Washington ismomentarily ruffled. For if there is one aspect which more than another saliently emerges from theseletters, it is that the GERMAN EMPEROR was wholly possessed by one master idea, and that ideawas war. Sleeping or waking, war colored the very texture of his mind.To the Liberal Manchester Guardian the letters show the Kaiser as a contemptible figure, "amediavalist fanatic on a modern throne." He is characterized as an "anti-Liberal," an. "arch-Tory,"a most irresponsible person in one of the most responsible offices in the world. The Guardian writes:Partly as cause and partly as effect, the GERMAN EMPEROR's fixed idea of war was inseparablyconnected with his dynastic ambitions. Step by step these are revealed in his letters, and shapethemselves into the gigantic plan of a vast confederation of States of which Germany should bethe head. Thence she could dominate the world. It is the old, fatal dream of world-conquest; the vision of SENNACHERIB, of ALEXANDER, of CÆSAR, of NAPOLEON. The GERMAN EMPERORhas been called a mediaevalist; but in truth his aspirations derive from thousands of years before theChristian era; and when he stood for days rapt in contemplation of the disinterment of ancientinscriptions from the sun-baked soil of the Mediterranean island it is odds but he was thinking of thehalf-mythical conquerors of vanished civilisations as his progenitors. Like them, the German War Lordwas confronted with one formidable obstacle towering in his path. Russia he might weaken andcajole; France he thought to subdue; Austria-Hungary was obedient; Italy might be persuaded; andas for the smaller nations, his foot would be on their necks. But what of the British Empire? Supremeon all seas, owning one-fifth of the habitable globe, peaceable until attacked, but when attackedindomitably stubborn, the English would never consent to an European hegemony. They might bedeceived for a time; but ultimately, it seems, they must be vanquished. Now and again, in the courseof the letters, that conviction of the GERMAN EMPEROR is vividly revealed. For, broadly regarded,the GERMAN EMPEROR's main purpose became the conquest and the subjugation of the BritishEmpire. The astute suggestion made to the Emperor NICHOLAS that he was threatened in the Easthad its part in bringing about the Russo-Japanese War, which left Russia weakened and humiliated;and therefore, so reasoned the KAISER, the more pliant to his will. He succeeded, indeed, in fasteningupon Russia a commercial treaty which ensured German trade predominance, and a diplomatic treatywhich was accepted by the Russian EMPEROR, conferring upon Germany political predominance.Up to this point it seems that NICHOLAS was deceived, or partly deceived. But what actuallyhappened was that the GERMAN EMPEROR'S cunning overreached itself. The terms of both treatieswere of a nature so monstrous that no nation would ultimately accept them.By this time, too, the German policy had necessarily aroused alarm throughout Europe, and awakenedantagonistic forces. Broadly speaking, the answer to the menace of a hostile European confederation,to which the GERMAN EMPEROR once thought of adding Japan, and, again, the United States, wasto divide the elements of the combination and so attain a balance of power. In this connection theworld owes very much to the sagacity and diplomatic skill of King EDWARD VII., who was, ofcourse, supported by his Ministers. The Triple Alliance secured by the KAISER was balanced by theTriple Entente; and the GERMAN EMPEROR'S design was for the time being frustrated; a failurehe never forgot nor forgave. The Great War was a tremendous attempt to redeem that defeat. Howcraftily planned, how skilfully manoeuvred, was the original design, are revealed in the letters. Andhere we may note that clever as the GERMAN EMPEROR was, he was not clever enough. Of a swiftand a penetrating intellect, possessed of immense ingenuity, the KAISER lacked what alone makesthese gifts effective. He lacked judgment. He lacked common sense. Common sense would have toldhim that world conquest is no longer practicable. Common sense would have warned him that toextort too much from a neighbor would annul the very purpose of the extortion. And a reasonedjudgment would have enabled the KAISER to perceive that even if it were possible to furfil his dream,the cost would be so frightful that none could gain by it, that the fulfilment could be no more than theaffair of a moment, and that the rest would be war, unending war. As matters stand, after the event,the war has brought no profit even to the victors, but a wide calamity and a profound disease whichcannot be healed in this generation. And he who before all others is most guilty, deprived of his glory,stripped of his possessions, discrowned and abject, dwells in a dishonorable exile, the pensioner of asmall nation which once he despised....
There can be no doubt that the ex-German Emperor was a great letter writer; the letters which he sent to the Czar prove it conclusively.
It is clear that in this correspondence the Emperor set out to make himself interesting, and it is equallyclear that he fully succeeded. Whatever may be the subject on which he is expatiating the Frenchmentality, the modern newspaper, the British Navy, the way to manage the people, the diplomacy ofKing Edward, the "Yellow Peril," the famous visit to Jerusalem, and so on he is always entertaining.He was, of course, tremendously interested in a vast number of subjects and he knew just enoughabout them never to be grotesque and not enough ever to be dull. And in this correspondence, he wasat his very best, for he was playing a great game. Indeed, to break the Franco-Russian Alliance, tomake the CZAR an enemy of England, to place Europe under German hegemony was an ambitionstrong enough to make even a dull man lively and to speed a clumsy and halting pen. It was only whenthe writer realised the game was up that the letters became shorter and less exuberant. But duringthose historic days when Great Britain, Russia, and France were drawing together under the impulseof a common danger, the Imperial scribe used every art to cajole, to flatter, to amuse, and to threatenthe Emperor Nicholas. Indeed, it is the variety of method employed that is one source of specialattraction in these letters. Suddenly, amidst the flatteries, the sage counsels, the tender solicitude, thedeep sympathy, the mailed fist appears, and a threat and almost a command are launched forth. Thenhe changes his tune again. But the aim is always the same, and though it failed perhaps because itfailed the letters are of extraordinary interest, not only for their "human" side, but because they arethe prelude to the great storm which broke on the world in 1914....
These intimate epistles, addressed to the late Emperor of RUSSIA, alone suffice to prove that fromfirst to last the GERMAN EMPEROR, in the prosecution of his vast and sinister designs, was so farfrom acting as a despot, ignoring the sentiments and predilections of his people, that he neverentertained the smallest doubt of their absolute and enthusiastic support. To what extent theirallegiance had been secured by that method of "mass-suggestion," of which a good deal has beenwritten, is another question. It is enough to know that the German nation was welded together as asingle instrument to accomplish the triumphant destiny of the Great German race....
It was one of the essential elements in the schemes of the GERMAN EMPEROR so to weaken Russiathat she should become subservient to the German hegemony; and the readiest means to that end wasto embroil Russia with Japan. Thus, in these crafty suggestions we trace the origin of the Russo-Japanese War. As the series proceeds the GERMAN EMPEROR'S hatred of England and his dislikeand jealousy of King EDWARD VII. become manifest. But inKING EDWARD the GERMAN MONARCH was dealing with an intelligence superior to hisown, anda talent for diplomacy to which this country owes much more than has yet been revealed. But if theGERMAN EMPEROR hated England, he held France in a stupid contempt, for which he subsequentlypaid a devastating price.
Although we have not the replies of the Emperor of Russia to complete the correspondence, theinternal evidence of the GERMAN EMPEROR's letters shows that the CZAR by no means allowedhis policy to be dominated by the German guile. When the decisive moment arrived the Emperor ofRussia chose the Triple Entente, and the GERMAN EMPEROR'S long and elaborate combinationswere completely foiled....
In the course of his letters it will be remarked that his IMPERIAL MAJESTY stooped to the basestdevices without a thought. It was perhaps this singular moral obtuseness which ultimately vitiated hisdiplomacy. He had a blind spot in his mind. At the same time the amiable duplicity of the GERMANEMPEROR'scorrespondence is so admirably done as to become an effect in art; and the letters ofWILLIAM HOHENZOLLERN will assuredly rank as a classic in that form of literature. . .
See AlsoThe Willy-Nicky Telegrams | Encyclopedia.comThe Willy- Nicky TelegramsFirst World War.com - Primary DocumentsThe Nicky and Willy telegrams (1914)One of two things invariably occurred to rulers or statesmen who tried to deal with the GERMANEMPEROR. Either they were compelled, like Austria and the Ottoman Empire, to accept asubordinate, even a servile, position, or, like certain British Ministers, they fell into the snares socarefully designed by the arch-conspirator. The Marquess of SALISBURY, the greatest statesmanof his time, entertained no illusions concerning the GERMAN EMPEROR, whose extraordinaryinstability of character had by 1898 become notorious. The inconsistency of the letter of May 30,1898, must have been evident to the Emperor of Russia, for if tentative offers of alliance were madeby Great Britain, they were, on the Imperial writer's own showing, conceived in the interests of peace,and yet in the same letter and in the next the GERMAN EMPEROR plainly insinuates that GreatBritain is inspired by some sinister design against the peace of Europe. We two, writes the GERMANEMPEROR to the CZAR, "have the same opinions: we want peace, and we have sustained and upheldit till now . . . they (the British) are trying hard, as far as I can make out, to find a Continental armyto fight for their interests."
At that time the feeling of France towards England was far from amicable; and that circ*mstanceapparently moved the GERMAN EMPEROR to tell the CZAR that the newest move" of the British"is the wish to gain France over from you, and they in consequence have suddenly decided to sendthe DUKE OF CONNAUGHT to the French Army Manouvres, a nice little plan of COURCELLES,I think, who is ardently at work between Paris and London. I already once warned your people ofhim!" The intention of these suggestions is to make as much mischief as possible between Russia,France, and England. The RUSSIAN EMPEROR is asked to suspect Great Britain of ulteriorpurposes inimical to Russia. Nothing that England can do is right; nor is anything more remarkablein the GERMAN EMPEROR'S correspondence than his intense hatred and jealousy of Great Britain.In this alone is he consistent. One of the chief reasons why the Cretan affair, which threatened aboutthis time to embroil all Europe, was so difficult to settle is now revealed. While Germany wasostensibly helping the other Powers to restore order in Crete, where the Turkswere slaying the Christians in their familiar light-hearted way, the GERMAN EMPEROR was secretlyinciting the CZAR to side with the Ottoman Empire and to prevent the expulsion of the Turks fromthe island. Diplomacy, in fact, was at a stand, and we now know why. The difficulty was solved byRear-Admiral NOEL (afterwards Admiral of the Fleet, Sir GERARD NOEL), who definitely orderedthe Turks to leave Crete, who saw to it that his orders were obeyed, and who was afterwards publiclycomplimented by Lord SALISBURY upon his action.
It is at this period, too, that the GERMAN EMPEROR's vast dream of Eastern conquest begins toemerge. He desires for the time being to secure the support of Russia, as an Oriental Power, and herrecommendation to the Mohammedan world in general. The vision of a Mohammedan Empire inspireshis memorable voyage to the Holy Land....
The progress of the correspondence between the Ex-EMPEROR and the late CZAR brings us to avery remarkable little drama in which the HOHENZOLLERN reveals in a sudden and baleful flash thetreachery of himself and of his race. He had been egging on the CZAR to his disastrous Manchurianadventure. He had described himself and the Emperor NICHOLAs as the two crusaders ofChristendom against the Yellow Peril. With the pen and even with the brush he had done his best torouse the Emperor of RUSSIA to a fanatical fervour, and his letters were full not indeed of explicitpledges but of hints and implications that he might be trusted as a brilliant second, or at least as abenevolent neutral in any such enterprise. Thus urged, and not, we may be certain, only by WILLIAM,but by all the agents of persuasion at the German command, Russia went to war. The EmperorNICHOLAS, as we see from the letter of the6th of June, 1904, regarded his Correspondent as a "real friend," and this "real friend" overflows withsympathy at the Russian naval losses and military embarrassments. The "real friend" also is ready tohelp with any information which will widen the quarrel, as, for example, that Japan has supplied Chinawith arms made of French steel, and that France has been induced by a perfidious England not to helpher Ally in the field or on the sea: 'II va sans dire that if France had been under the obligation ofhelping you I would, of course, not have budged a finger to harm her, for that would have been mostillogical on the part of the author of the Picture 'Yellow Peril."'
But the time comes when Russia is so deeply engaged that she must either draw troops from herWestern frontier or submit to defeat. And then the "real friend" reveals himself. He will guarantee thatWestern frontier; in plain language, he will not attack Russia when she can no longer defendherself but at a price, and that price is a Commercial Treaty. Now there are treaties and treaties, butthis particular Treaty was, in fact, a Treaty of Exploitation -- of such exploitation, indeed, that nocountry -- at least no country not a Free Trade country -- would have submitted to it unless undercompulsion. Russia was greatly dependent upon the German market for the sale of her corn, and in1902 Germany had raised the duty on Russian corn from 43 to 78 per cent. WITTE had replied byraising the Russian duty on German manufactures. Germany now demanded that the Russian excessduty on her manufactures should be abolished, but refused to make any concession in the Germanexcess duty on Russian corn. Russia protested, but was forced to grant a practically open marketto German manufactures and preferential railway terms without any reciprocal benefit....
There is naturally some delay in signing such a document, and the Emperor WILLIAM writes -- fromthe Mediterranean -- a letter which in one lurid flash reveals that sinister character of which we havespoken. He speaks with illconcealed irritation of the delay, and adds:
"What a lark it would be if you suddenly were to thump your imperial fist on the 'Table of green cloth,'and give the lazy ones a jump! After all, one cannot wait for ever, considering the many months thathave already been wasted. A promise of a nice picnic in Siberia will, I am sure, do wonders." TheEMPEROR, in fact, is to threaten his Ministers with Siberia if they do not sign a treaty disastrous toRussia! And the KAISER thinks that the CZAR will be amused by such a proposal! We are leftwondering whatCZAR replied to his "real friend," but we may imagine that the reply was tinged with sarcasm.
It is appalling to think that the brain behind them (the letters) was for many years the most self-assertively active in the international affairs of the world, and that a nation with the immense capacity and energy of the Germans should not have shaken itself free of such captaincy before the catastrophe came.Professor Walter Goetz's comment on the Kaiser's letters may be said to be a fair expression ofGermany's view of the Kaiser after the publication of his correspondence with the Czar. This view isthat although Wilhelm was an irresponsible person, although his mistakes were numerous, henevertheless sincerely worked for peace and thewar was not of his making. Upon the publication of the Kaiser's letters in Germany, the Nationalists,the strongest group of monarchists in the country, at their convention in Cologne, adopted aresolution repudiating their former emperor. In part, this resolution read: "The Kaiser's letters givea true picture of his haphazard, irresponsible policy which vacillated constantly. The effect of theseletters has been revolting. Although we are still convinced monarchists, we have the right to criticize.Therefore, we announce that the person who was our former Kaiser is no longer representative of ourmonarchistic principles."Professor Goetz sees in the Kaiser a poor diplomatist primarily, a man who chased after wild schemeswithout tending to the vital interests of Germany. The Kaiser is represented as having had goodintentions, but as blundering in his efforts to accomplish them. Profesor Goetz's article, in part,follows:At bottom the KAISER had only one subject -- the indefeasible excellence of monarchy by divine right.Whatever else he might mention, the KAISER was always asserting by implication the infallibility ofanointed sovereigns. "We Christian Kings and Emperors," he writes, "have one holy duty imposed onus by Heaven, that is, to uphold the principle von Gottes Gnaden [by the Grace of God]." Heevidently believed it. As one reads on through the letters one becomes steadily more and morethankful that in England we dealt with such stuff, once for all, in the seventeenth century. KINGCHARLES'S head keeps on coming in, all over the manuscript....
These letters from the KAISER to the CZAR suggest obliquely a sinister sketch of the last unhappyautocrat of Russia. For many of the KAISER's letters are such as it was a baseness in the CZAR toreceive without sending such a stinging reply as would have stopped the whole ignoble campaign ofback-biting and disloyalty. While these letters in which the KAISER bespattered the whole Frenchnation with contemptuous abuse were going apparently unrebuked, at any rate unprevented to theCZAR, the CZAR was posing in public as the loyal and chivalrous friend of France. While the CZARwas an honoured guest of the people of France he was accepting at any rate a passive part in acorrespondence in which his hosts, and especially their army, were accused of dishonour and lying,corruption and cowardice. We knew already that before the Russian Revolution no military secret ofours or France's was safe at the Russian Court. And now we see why. If these letters were what theCZAR would read from the KAISER during the honeymoon of the Franco-Russian Alliance, there wasno bar of honour left to keep "Willy" and "Nicky" from sending andreceiving abuse of France and England during the war.
The luckless CZAR cannot answer now for hispassive complicity in this breach of decency. In a sense, we cannot even accuse him of personal failure.Fate set him up for an autocrat, and whatever may have been true in some simpler age of the world,if there ever was any, it is clear now that a man cannot be brought up as an autocrat without suchdamage to judgment and character as makes him unfit to exercise any determining infuence on publicaffairs. The KAISER's letters are those of a lost mind not, apparently, a mind organically deficient,but a mind deprived of all sense of the relative values of things by the lifelong nursing of the illusionthat some 78,000,000 men and women are "his," as the deer in a park are his, and that God has madeit his, the KAISER's, job to go up and down the world scheming and bluffing and grabbing and pullingwires and setting other peoples by the ears in order to get "his" people on in the world and show "his"Reichstag how little it can do as compared with a modern FREDERICK THE GREAT or HENRYTHE FIFTH. The wires pulled in these letters were seldom very nice. Sometimes they weredisreputable with a vengeance. The setting-on of Russia to wear herself out in fighting Japan, for thehonour of CHRIST and the confusion of BUDDHA, was pretty bad. But the letters written in theprosecution of that piece of policy are run close by one written a little before Christmas, 1898, from Palestine, in which fervour about Holy Places is oddly jumbled with almost incoherent rage at thefailure of France and England to go to war about Fashoda. This passionate cultivation of ill-willbetween neighbours is the most repulsive ingredient in the diplomatic method of the KAISER.SHAKESPEARE's Bolingbroke, another typical OldDiplomatist, gave it as a precept of statecraft to his son to "busy giddy minds in foreign quarrels." TheKAISER tried to improve on this by busying foreign minds in giddy quarrels. In these letters he triesto embroil Russia with Japan, with France, and, apropos of Crete in 1898, with England, whom heaccuses of an intention to grab Crete or Suda Bay, just as he had accused us of plotting to violate theDardanelles when we tried, somewhat feebly, to dissuade ABDUL HAMID from murderingArmenians. The Old Diplomacy is seen, again, in its full panoply of cynicism where Mr.CHAMBERLAIN made his famous overture to Germany for an alliance at a time when our relationswith France were at their worst and our yellow press was genially proposing to "roll France in mudand blood," contrary to the advice of slow-coaches like ourselves. On getting the offer, the KAISERat once wrote a glowing account of its handsomeness to the CZAR, pointedly indicating that thesuggested league would include England, Germany, Austria, Italy, the United States, and Japan, andexclude Russia and France, and then went on: "Now, as my old and trusted friend, I beg you to tellme what you can offer me and will do if I refuse." Simply the auction idea. All the balm on thisanointed King did not prompt him to anything nobler than that.
These letters need not shun the light of publicity. They do, it is true, exhibit all the foibles whichdetract from the picture that WILHELM II. presents to the observer; still on the other hand they allbear witness to his good intentions and, above everything else, to his honest desire for peace. Thispositive statement may well be made, before any opponents, filled with prejudice, will exploit themfor their purposes.Valuable as the contemporary comment on the Kaiser's letters is, the final judgment on them andtheir author must be left to the future when passions and prejudices will have given way to calminvestigation and impartial analysis. History will announce its own sentence on the Kaiser only whenthe letters of his correspondents, Czar Nicholas of Russia, King Edward of England, Francis Josephof Austria-Hungary, the Sultan of Turkey and the Balkan kings are revealed to the world. So far onlythe archives of the Romanoffs have been made public by the Russian Government. What a boon tohumanity it would be if the enormous volume of truth lying buried in the archives of a dozen Europeancourts, existing and extinct, were suddenly to be disclosed to humanity!The letters are written in English, the language which both rulers always used, in conversation as wellas in writing to each other. The CZAR'S answers are missing; here and there some traces as to how they ran can be found in the letters of WILHELM II. For us, however, those answers would be secondary ininterest, compared with the KAISER'S expressions. Hardly any evidence will be needed to establishthe fact that WILHELM II. was the personality with far more strength and initiative. As the lettersshow, the active political aims are on his side. He wants to produce an impression on the CZAR; hewants to cement Russia's policy with that of Germany, in accordance with the needs of the Germaninterests and the peace of Europe. It would surely be desirable to have the CZAR'S answers; theywould settle beyond any doubt the historical events. Still, at this moment the world is concerned withWILHELM II., with his alleged responsibility for the world war, with his entire personality, and forthis purpose the share borne by him in this correspondence will suffice for us. The contents of theletters are ample enough to give us an insight into the KAISER'S political realm of thought, althoughhigh politics is the very subject about which we are being informed only in a fragmentary way, andsome important questions are not discussed. Moreover, in order to form a final judgment, the readerwould have to be placed in a position to follow through a similar series of confidential letters thesimultaneous relations towards Queen VICTORIA of England and King EDWARD VII.; for howeverclose and unquestionably evident the friendship towards NICHOLAS II. was, and however pointedsome expressions he uses about England may sound, still friendship and tactics were undoubtedlyclosely in touch with each other on all these occasions of political intercourse, and the urgent desireagain and again shown by the KAISER for new possibilities of intercourse can be taken only as indicating his apprehension that influences brought byothers to bear upon NICHOLAs II. might interfere with the direction that his German friend wasattempting to give to matters.
WILHELM II., who overrated himself and his words to such a marked extent, was evidently unableto realize that it was just he, almost more than anybody else, who jarred upon the feelings of othersand provoked unpleasant opinions; he believed in his charming amiability, in his persuasive talents andin the deeply rooted right of his convictions. He was not conscious of the want of tact which notinfrequently went hand in hand with affability and estranged from him persons of importance.Appearances pointed to it that the meetings with the CZAR were successful -- that political resultssprung from them; and this is why this expedient was resorted to over and over again. Undoubtedlythe CZAR was loyally devoted to the KAISER and inclined to heed the influence of his friend, whowas about as much ahead of him in age as in length of reign, and whom he this is said with hesitationand uncertainty -- may have admired for his brilliant qualities.
Such were the natural dispositions and limitations which engendered in WILHELM II. the first greatdeception in which he was living: namely the belief that a general policy could be built up on thepersonal relations of the rulers. The very personality of the CZAR would hardly suffice to offer thesecurities required for such an assumption. For however the descriptions of the CZAR that have sofar appeared, may vary in detail, still all critics agree as to the lack of a strong and clearly expressedwill on his part. It is true that the CZARINA, with her German inclinations, is likely to have exercisedconsiderable influence over her husband; still the letters published in this book furnish the proof that all brotherly friendship could notdivert the Russian policy from its ultimate fatal aims. The KAISER had, so it seems, tried everythingto adapt himself to the CZAR'S personality and to retain his confidence. He had shown to him and theRussian naval office secret German ship-building plans, while giving utterance to the thought that thefleets of both countries were to be considered as one great organization; he offered a suggestion thatthe German Bagdad railway might serve to transport Russian troops in a trice from Odessa to Koweiton the Gulf of Persia, so as to halt the British there; he informed the CZAR at once of the Englishalliance offered in 1898; yet, after all, neither friendship nor confidence was the decisive factor in highpolitics.
In the same way as the KAISER was relying on erroneous premises when judging of the formalelements of politics, he was unable to place himself in the midst of the conditions that existed in theworld. However modern the KAISER has often appeared to be when handling questions concerningthe future of Germany, when showing an interest in technical problems and conferring witheconomical experts whatever their creed might be, a fundamental contrast still existed between himand the world of today. Devoted as he was to the duties imposed on him by his vocation as a ruler,he could not help viewing that vocation as a divine mission and this led him to a blind overestimationof the princely system and of princely persons, and to an underestimation, no less blind, of other formsof government, and other persons. The letters published in this volume are rich in examples of thisdisastrous imagination. It was this mistaken idea which, notwithstanding all plainlyvisible notes of warning, led to the belief that Germany and Russia had to represent commonmonarchical interests, in opposition to an inferior world. An understanding of real facts, while foundhere and there, is yet on the whole lacking to a surprising extent. Roughly speaking, the letters startwith the time when Germany entered into world politics. It might be assumed therefore that theoccasion existed for discussing and settling the relations of Germany with the great world powers. Butthe KAISER is hardly ever seen to handle such concrete questions as would adjust contrary views,establish a community of interests and safeguard the course of the policy of Germany. Always the"traditional friendship" between the HOHENZOLLERNS and the CZARS, and next to that also thecommunity of monarchical interests, are the proposed link to connect Russia and Germany.Republican institutions, the parliamentary system, anarchy, nihilism and revolution are pushed forwardby the KAISER and presented as possessing a dangerous inner relationship; this perspective is openedbefore the ally of the French Republic, to frighten him. In the common interest the cry is raised tobeware of English intrigues (nor, of course, can there be any doubt that they existed); but in vain willthe reader look for political ideas that could have established a Russian-German community ofinterests on a solid basis. Instead of this, the "Yellow Peril" dominates the KAISER; in the Far Easthe sees looming a menace to the white race, to western civilization. This thought is reiterated like amonomaniac's idea -- the difficulty of German world politics had never in any way entered the mindof the KAISER when he imagined the warding off of "Buddhism, heathenism and barbarism" ascommon tasks which were to bind together the European powers. Or did he bring forward here views that were to occupy only the Russian mind, and was it his intention to divert Russiawith all means towards eastern Asia?
German statesmen surely were pleased to see Russia draw herself back from her old favorite field oftroublemaking activity, the Balkans, and map out aims in the east which were likely to occupy her fordecades to come. However, it is not Germany who has pointed out to Russia this new field, but thesuccesses of the Japanese in the war against China gave the impulse to Russia to proceed in thatdirection. Her intention was to secure the eastern sea coast and an influence on China, before Japancould become an annoying competitor. Russian public opinion had for weeks been aroused againstJapan, and in favor of having free play in the east, before the KAISER expressed himself to the CZARin this matter. Russia was the leading power in the common action of Germany, France and Russiaagainst Japan; no instigation from Germany was needed to make Russia discover her interests ineastern Asia and stand up for them with increasing obstinacy. If the KAISER, in language rich withenthusiasm, extolled the CZAR as the author of these new political tendencies, we might well find inthis fact a hope for deliverance from the nightmare which Russia had constituted for Europe, as wellas a hope for common advantages, as is clearly shown by the wish expressed for a German coalingstation in the orient.
German politics, of course, had to take into consideration one more point: to divert Russia from jointaction with France against Germany. Surely, the KAISER cannot be blamed in this case for harboringsuch a wish. In attempting to realize his desire, he chose the means of stirring up the CZAR'Smonarchical instinct against the French Republic. This could, however, have but little effect, after Czar ALEXANDER III. had once overcome thisinborn dislike and closed with the republic an unprejudiced alliance. Later, in 1904 and 1905, camethe exceedingly strange attempt to draw France into a Russian-German alliance. This may well beconsidered as the culminating point of the entire correspondence.
Undoubtedly it would have been a full triumph for the KAISER'S policy had he been able now toeffect new and clearly defined arrangements with Russia. Not only would this have disposed of thecharges based on his non-renewal of BISMARCK'S "reinsurance" treaty, which had guaranteed toGermany the friendly neutrality of Russia in case of an attack of France, and there would thus havebeen inaugurated a better and more honest form of cooperation with Russia; but the policy ofEDWARD VII. would also have met with a serious obstacle, and the French hope for revenge wouldhave been ultimately doomed. The refusal of the English alliance offer of 1898 and 1901, which meantthe critical turning-point for the entire position of Germany, would have been counterbalanced; shewould have won new safety. All this makes it easy to understand the exulting satisfaction which beamsforth from the letters written by the KAISER at that time.
But very soon it was to become plain that the weavers of-this loom had been working entirely withoutBISMARCK'S masterly hand. The very first intimations contained in the KAISER'S letter of July 27thabout the secret treaty are surprising: so this alliance, which would indeed have taken a foremost rankin the annals of history, had been closed by the two emperors in a personal conference of one day'sduration, without the cooperation of the authoritative ministers?The chancellor of the German Empire received confidential information only after the KAISER'Sreturn from his journey, and the same thing happened with the Russian minister of the exterior.
But if there still existed a remnant of political sagacity, now was the time for it when the seriousnessof the matter forced itself on the understanding; when a way had to be found to escape this desperatesituation. It sounds like the statement of a man either totally blind or clearly strained in his utterances,when on January 29th, 1906, the KAISER resorts to a coarse jest about the "woodcutter Fallieres"(meaning the president of the French Republic) in attempting to get rid of the significant fact that theCZAR wants to receive a French aide-de-camp in his suite; so funny does this arrangement look tothe KAISER that he can hardly check his mirth. Was he really unable to see how France wasbeginning to eclipse him even in the CZAR'S personal surroundings? And furthermore: in June, 1906,the KAISER learned, from what the CZAR told him, that England was trying to come to anunderstanding with Russia about Asia. Not even this fact prompts the KAISER to take up theconcrete questions that are to be solved; it merely causes him to become worked up again and againabout the "Yellow Peril," which he believes to have discovered, and which according to him is to helpbridge over the conflicting interests in Europe and the near east. It would appear that he fails torecognize, while thus reasoning, that the differences between Japan and America, Japan and Russiaare of a political and economic nature, and that the alliance of England with Japan satisfied theimmediate interests of both countries more satisfactorily than a crusade of the white against the yellow -race would have done.
Thus the political accomplishments of these letters are not especially encouraging. In fact, they allowthe reader to look only into details, but not into the whole of the German-Russian relations. Severalof the most important questions, for instance the Russian suggestion to interfere in the Boer War, arenot referred to in the letters as we have them. But they do show how a policy went to grief which hadattempted to solve the gravest problems with insufficient means. They show the KAISER not as thenation's political leader, but filled with untenable ideas as to the vocation of a sovereign andinternational politics, and they show us the difficulties under which the responsible functionaries ofthe imperial government had to work the entire time. Yet, one thing these letters disclose without anydoubt: never has the KAISER occupied himself with schemes of attack, with preparations for theworld war. The dominating thought in every instance is how to assure peace. That he wanted to seeGermany and Russia as the center of the league which was to guarantee peace, needs no defense. Forhe had to transact German, not French or English politics. In making efforts to free Russia from theFrench and English embrace, he acted within his rights (however inadequate were his means); the verycourse of events has proven that this embrace ultimately meant the world war. That the KAISERwanted to avoid this war, is demonstrated by these letters, and this is what makes them historicaldocuments which will bear testimony against our enemies as long as an impartial science of historywill exist.
ISAAC DON LEVINE.
Chicago,
April, 1920
Neues Palais, 8/XI/94
My dear Nicky
The heavy and responsible task for which Providence has destinied you has come upon you with thesuddeness of a surprise, through the so unexpected and untimely death of your dear lamented father.1These lines are to express my fullest and warmest sympathy with you and your Alix 2 and your poordistressed mother.3 I can well understand the feelings which must have agitated your heart inwitnessing the ebbing away of the life of your father, as his illness and sudden passing away was sovery like my own dear Papa's;4 with whose character and kind geniality the late Czar had so manylikness. My prayers to God for you and your happiness are unceasing. May heaven comfort you inyour grief and give you strength for your heavy duties, and may a long and peaceful reign give youthe opportunity of looking after the welfare of your subjects. The sympathy and real grief at the sountimely end of your lamented father in my country will have shown you how strong the monarchicalinstinct is and how Germany feels for you and your subjects.As former you will always find me the same in undiminished friendship and love to you. What ourpolitical ideals are we both know perfectly and I have nothing to add to our last conversation inBerlin,5 I only can repeat the expression or you and the assurance that I shall always cultivate the old relationsof mutual friendship with your house in which I was reared by my Grandfather,6 and some examples of which I was so glad to be able to give to your dear Papa in these last six months of his reign, andwhich I am happy to hear were fully appreciated by him. I would have come myself to pray with youat the funeral,7 but I have so much to do with administration at home that it is impossible. Henry willbe the bearer of my messages, Gen. v. Plessen,8 commandant of my Headquarters, Lieut. Col. v. Moltke9 my Aide de Camp, and Gen. v. Villaune10 your old friend will accompany him on board his ship to Cronstadt. At the same time by land Col. v. Saussin of the Kaiser Alexander Garde Grend. Reg. I. will report himself to you as the new Chef of the Regiment. Whereas to your Regiment of Hussars11 I have given your name of which they will be immensely proud. In the first named Guard Regiment the person of the late Tsar was always highly venered and last Mondays the whole corpsof its officers and the four Colours of the Reginal joined their prayers with mine of the chapel of theRussian Embassy at Berlin. Now, dearest Nicky, Good bye, God bless andprotect you and dear Alix and give you happiness in your new married life, that is the warm wish of
Your most aff-ate and devoted friend and cousin William.
Notes
1. Alexander III., the father of Nicholas II., died at Livadia on November Ist, 1894.
2. Princess Alix of Hesse, to whom Nicholas was betrothed. They were married 18 days after thedate of this letter, on November 26th, 1894.
4. Emperor Frederick.
5. The conversation referred to took place on January 28th, 1894.
6. William I., the first German emperor.
7. The funeral of the late Czar took place on November 19th, 1894. Prince Henry of Prussia represented the Kaiser.
8. Von Plessen was commandant of the Kaiser's headquarters
9. Lieutenant-Colonel von Moltke a nephew of the great Moltke -- was the Kaiser's aide-de-camp since 1891. From 1906 to December, 1914, he was Chief of the German General Staff
10. Von Villaune is probably General Carl von Villauny.
11. The 8th Hussars.
II.
Potsdam, 5/I/95,
My dear Nicky
Your kind letter which Knorring brought to me involved very interesting but very sad news. I am verythankful for your explanation and fully understand the motives which prompt you to decide aboutCount Schouvaloff.1 In the same time I can assure you that I am deeply grieved at losing excellentPaul, who was the only ambassador at Berlin with whom I was on really intimate terms and who wasan "ami intime" to me as far as a non-German could claim such name. I will miss him very muchindeed!I He fully deserves the eulogies you gave him in your rescript and the near and intimaterelations of our Courts and People could not have been better looked after than by him. I hope andtrust that the person whom you are going to select to replace him will be able to carry on the workin the same manner and with the same thruthfullness and openess of character like Schouvaloff; as therelations of our two countries rest on traditional bases, quite other than those with other nations, andare of commanding influence on the whole of the world! At your dear Fathersexpress wish I replaced Schweinitz2 by Werder, if I could at the same time express a wish, it would be that you chose either Pahlen,3 Richter4 or Staal5 as remplaçants if possible.6
Now let me wish you a Happy New Year at the side of that dear Angel Alix, and may it be a year ofpeace and prosperity! My Xmas gift will I hope amuse you, it is an album with photos from theFahnenweihe at Berlin.
Hoping that we shall be able to meet each other somewhere this year
I remain
Your most aff-ate friend
Willy
Notes
I. Count Schouvaloff was one of Russia's foremost diplomats. He was Russian Ambassador to London in 1878, during the Berlin Conference. On January 3rd, 1895, he was transferred from his post asRussian ambassador in Berlin, which he filled for nine years, to the Governor-Generalship of Warsaw.
2. General von Schweinitz was German ambassador in Petrograd until 1892, when after Bismarck's fall, he was replaced by General von Werder.
3. Count von der Pahlen a high dignitary of the Russian court.
4. General Richter was chief of the Czar's Military Household.
5. Georges de Staal was Russiqn ambassador in London from 1884 to I903.
6. The Kaiser's suggestions were ignored by the Czar, and Count Osten-Sacken was appointed tosucceed Count Schouvaloff.
III
Berlin 7/II/95
Dearest Nicky
Egloffstein1 will, I hope, be able to bring over the whole heap of porcelain without any breakage. Heis instructed to arrange the table so as it would be if you gave a dinner for 50; so that you should havethe coup d'oeil of the whole affair. I hope that my manufacturer has done everything to fulfill yourwishes and that the present may be useful to you both.
Since the sad weeks you had to go through have passed much has happened in Europe. You have lostan excellent old servant of your predecessors, old Giers,2 who was a very good fellow whom I muchesteemed. France has changed par surprise her head and government3 and through the amnestyopened the doors to all the worst malefactors the former people with difficulty had managed toimprison. The impulse given to the Democrats and the Revolutionary party is also to be felt here. MyReichstag4 behaves as badly as it can, swinging backwards and forwards between the socialists egged on by the Jews, and the ultramontane Catholiks; bothparties beeing soon fit to be hung all of them, as far as I can see.
In England the ministry5 is toddling on to its fall amidst universal derision! In short everywhere the"principe de la Monarchie" is called upon to show itself strong. That is why I am so glad at the capitalspeech6 you made other day to the deputations in response to some addresses for reform. It was verymuch to the point and made a deep impression everywhere.
For the opening of our Canal7 in the end of June I have invited all European Governments to sendwarships to Kiel, I hope your fleet will also be represented by a ship or two?With my respects to your Mamy and many compliments to Alix, I remain
Your most aff-ate friend
Willy
Notes.
I. A Marshal of the Kaiser's Court, who conveyed Wilhelm's wedding present to the Czar.
2. Nicholas de Giers was Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs since 1882.
3. M. Casimir-Périer, President of the French Republic, resigned on January Isth, 1895, when theDupuy Cabinet was overthrown by the Chamber. M. Félix Faure was elected President on January17th, and on January 26th, M. Ribot formed a Cabinet which introduced and carried a bill givingamnesty to political offenders.
4. On December 6th, :894, at the first sitting in the new Reichstag building, six socialists refused to risewhen the president called for three cheers for the Kaiser.
5. The Roseberry government fell on June 21st, 1895.
6. The historic speech made by the young Czar on January 29th, in reply to a deputation of the Zemstvos come to plead for reforms. Nicholas II. spoke of the reforms asked by the Zemstvos as "unrealizable dreams," concluding his speech with the memorable words, "I shall uphold the principle of autocracy tS firmly and unflinchingly as did my ever-lamented father."
7. The Kiel Canal was opened on June 21st, 1895.
IV
Kaltenbronn1 Schwarzwald 16/IV 95
Dearest Nicky
As Prince Radolin,sup>2 leaves shortly for Petersburg I send these few lines by him. He is an excellent andwarm friend of mine, who has been proved by the difficult task he had when beeing Papa's Chief ofthe Household during his short reign he stubbornly resisted any trials of intrigue from any side. Youmay place full and implicit confidence in him, his discreetness is proverbial and he is burning to doeverything in his power to please us both and to tighten the traditional ties which unite our familiesand countries since nearly a century. He hates the Poles and has no more to do with them or interestin them than with the Sandwich Islanders.
I thank you sincerely for the excellent way in which you initiated the combined action of Europe3 forthe sake of its interests against Japan. It was high time that energetic steps were taken, and will makean excellent impression in Japan as elsewhere. It shows to evidence how necessary it is that we shouldhold together, and also that there is existent a base of common interests upon which all Europeannations may work in joint action for the welfare of all as is shown by the adherence of France to ustwo. May the conviction that this can be done without touching a nations honour, take root more andmore firmly, then no doubt the fear of war in Europe will dissipate more and more. The kind and mostvaluable messages which you sent me through Osten Sacken4 by Count Eulenburgs transmission inVienna have given me a signal proof of your loyalty and openness towards me. I shall certainly do allin my power to keep Europe quiet and also guard the rear or Russia so that nobody shall hamper youraction towards the Far East! For that is clearly the great task of the future for Russia to cultivate theAsian Continent and to defend Europe from the inroads of the Great Yellow race. In this you willalways find me on your side ready to help you as best I can. You have well understood that call ofProvidence and have quickly grasped the moment; it is of immense political and historical value andmuch good will come of it. I shall with interest await the further development of our action and hopethat, just as I will gladly help you to settle the question of eventual annexations5 of portions ofterritory for Russia, you will kindly see that Germany may also be able to acquire a Port somewherewere it does not "gêne" you. I am afraid that, as the Norwegians~6are in a state bordering on insanity I may not be able to make my summer tour there, but shall have to cruise about on the Swedish coast of the Baltic. Should that be the case, could not we have a meeting somewhere for our two yachts were it suits youand have quiet little chat between ourselves? It would be so nice. Now good bye dearest Nicky, givemy best love to Alix and respectful compliments to your Mama, from Ever
Your most devoted and affate friend
Willy
P.S. Radolin is quite "eingeweiht" in all my ideas I just developed to you.
Notes
I. Shooting box in Black Forest near Wildbad.
2.. German ambassador in Constantinople, 1892-1895; in Petrograd, 1895-1901; in Paris, 190I-I910. He succeeded General von Werder at Petrograd.
3. The protest of Russia, France and Germany made on April 24th against the Chinese-JapaneseTreaty of Shimonoseki of April 17th, which forced Japan to give up the Liao-tung peninsula and PortArthur.
4 Count Nicholas Osten-Sacken, Russian ambassador in Berlin.
5. These annexations were Germany's seizing of Kiao-Chau, Russia's seizing of Port Arthur andEngland's seizing of Weihai-wei in 1898.
6. Norway was in the midst of a great political crisis. Ten years later the separation of Norway andSweden took place.
V
Stora Sundby I0/VII 95
Dearest Nicky
My journey in Sweden and along its shores bring me opposite to your shores and to your buen retiroand I cannot let this moment pass, when I am only a short cruize away from you, without sending youa 1ine as I shall not unhappily be able to meet you on the salty brine. Let me once more thank youwith all my heart for the sending of those splendid ships1 of yours, which so ably and powerfullyrepresented the Russian Navy at Kiel. Alexei2 was kindness and joviality itself and did everythingin his power to make intercourse with our Russian comrades everything that could be wished for.Your kind permission to place him à la suite of our navy made my officers very proud and seemedto have given him pleasure. I had the opportunity of some serious talk about Eastern Asian Affairswith Alexei and also his good old Baron Schilling who was a very great friend of my Grandfathers.He will I suppose already have reported to you about it. I was glad to be able to show, how ourinterests were entwined in the Far East, that my ships had been ordered to second yours in case of need when things looked dcubtful. That Europe had to be thankfulto you that you so quickly had perceived the great future for Russia in the cultivation of Asia and in theDefense of the Cross and the old Christian European culture against the inroads of the Mongols andBuddhism, that it was natural that if Russia was engaged in this tremendous work you wished to haveEurope quiet and your back free; and that it was natural and without doubt that this would be my taskand that I would let nobody try to interfere with you and attack from behind in Europe during the timeyou were fullfilling the great mission which Heaven has shaped for you. That was as sure as Amen inChurch! One incident took place of which I think I ought to tell you as I am quite certain that ithappened without Alexei's knowledge, but having become known among our officers created a verypainful impression. On board the Grossiaschtschy -- the vessel which I invited Admiral Skrydlow3 andhis Captains to pass the Canal with -- two Engineer Officers were secretly embarked which had notbeen announced to our Authorities. The Eldest was Colon. Buhnow. These in conjunction with alieutenant who is specially trained for the purpose and who had a large apparatus took photographsof our Forts and batteries made notes and sketches all along the road and finally when Skrydlow sawthat my Naval Attaché was rather astonished to seequite strange people on the ship -- were introduced to him as two directors of waterworks andwaterways! At Kiel Bubnow's bearing became so "suspecte" that Police and Gendarmes followed him.He went about in plain clothes and was prowling about the fortifications, which was strictly forbiddento strangers!
Now I think this is not quite fair, if you are invited as guest at such a fête in a foreign country whichwithout reserve throws open its gates to you and lets you into its war harbour, to abuse of hospitalityin this manner, to try to spy out your friend and that even under assumed character! The consequenceis that this will make people very careful with Russian warships and creates uneasy feelings which Iso deplore and hope to overcome. Pray excuse my mentioning this matter, but I thought it better totell you directly instead of making diplomatic notes etc. as you know how I feel for you and Russia.But I do wish to have every difficulty which could arise in the work of drawing our countries closertogether, removed before it strikes root.
Goodbye dearest Nicky my best love to Alix and to you, with wishes for a quiet summer and a nicelittle boy to come believe me dear Nicky
Ever your most affectionatefriend and cousin
Willy
Notes1. The "Imperator Alexander II" and the "Rurik."
2. Grand Duke Alexei, an uncle of the Czar, was for many years the Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy.
3. Commander of the Russian Squadron at Kiel. Later Skrydlow became Chief of the RussianAdmiralty.
